Corruption and the extractive industries transparency initiative by Papyrakis, Elissaios et al.








                                                        Abstract

















Over the last two decades many scholars have increasingly drawn attention to institutional explanations of the resource curse – that is, a negative link between mineral resources​[1]​ and several institutional variables (for example, for transparency, see Arezki & Brückner, 2011; Leite & Weidmann, 2002, for rule of law, see Kolstad, 2009; Norman, 2009; Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 2012; for quality of bureaucracy, see Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2008; Isham, Woodcock, Pritchett, & Busby, 2005; for property rights protection, see Baggio & Papyrakis, 2010; Brunnschweiler, 2008). The paper aims to evaluate the success of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (an international standard promoting transparency in mineral economies, see Section 2 for a detailed description) in reducing corruption in participating countries (and, hence, in partly protecting them against an ‘institutional resource curse’).
			There is still very little known about the impact of EITI membership on corruption in mineral-rich countries. There have been some excellent first attempts to reflect on and empirically estimate such links. Kolstad and Wiig (2009) provide an excellent discussion on how the effect of EITI membership on corruption is likely to be far from straightforward. The EITI initiative focuses on transparency in revenue collection without addressing issues related to the expenditure side – this might limit the beneficial impact of the EITI on curbing corruption in implementing countries. Several additional issues may further complicate the relationship between EITI membership and reduction in corruption – for example, stakeholders involved in the EITI process may also engage in rent-seeking and patronage. Caitlin Corrigan (2014) recently provided the first elaborate empirical study that attempts to statistically estimate the links between EITI membership and the level of several institutional quality proxies. Corrigan (2014) finds that while mineral rich countries suffer from worse institutions, the effect is partly mitigated for EITI participating countries (for example, in the case of government effectiveness and rule of law).

Contribution
We contribute to this strand of the literature in several ways. First, to our knowledge this is the first empirical attempt (using panel data) to explore how EITI membership links to variation in changes in corruption rather than variation in the level of corruption across countries – in other words, the research focus is not on whether EITI member countries are characterised by lower or higher corruption at each point in time (as in Corrigan, 2014), but whether they are more successful in reducing corruption over time, other things equal. Explaining cross-country variation in changes of corruption (rather than in the levels of corruption) is more meaningful, given that the level of institutional quality is shaped by long historical processes (for example, see Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001; Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2008; Nunn, 2009). While EITI participation (or any other initiative) can reduce the gap in corruption levels between mineral-rich states with bad institutions and their more transparent counterparts, it would probably take decades if not more to fully eliminate this (in other words, the level of institutions is likely to be explained more meaningfully by long-term historical factors rather than relatively recent policy initiatives, such as the EITI).   
	Naturally, mineral resources and participation in the EITI scheme are unlikely to be the sole factors driving changes in transparency over time. There is a large empirical literature that attempts to identify the macroeconomic determinants of corruption, relating, for instance, its cross-country variation with the level of economic development (Persson, 2003; Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Serra, 2006), economic growth (Aidt, Dutta, & Sena, 2008; Paldam, 2002) and democratic accountability (Chowdhury, 2004; Lederman, Loayza, & Soares, 2005; Saha & Gounder, 2013; Treisman, 2000). Our empirical model draws from this empirical literature and a more detailed discussion behind the selection of control variables and underlying theoretical mechanisms is provided in Section 3 (for a more comprehensive review of the empirical literature on the determinants of corruption, please see Olken & Pande, 2012 and Rothstein & Teorrell, 2015).
	
	We measure changes in corruption over time by the change in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by Transparency International – that is, one of the most comprehensible and widely used proxy of cross-country variation in corruption based on expert assessments and opinion surveys (for seminal studies making use of the index, see Aidt, 2011; Dobson and Andres, 2011; Dobson and Dobson, 2012; Elbahnasawy, 2014; Hanf et al., 2011; Krause & Méndez, 2009; Swaleheen, 2008; Wu, 2006). Second, we examine whether the stage in EITI implementation (initial commitment, candidature, full compliance) influences the pace of changes in corruption and we also explore whether there is an oil-specific effect. 
	The next section provides a description of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and its possible implications for corruption in member countries. Section 3 is devoted to our empirical analysis on EITI membership and changes in corruption. We find that while, on the whole, mineral rich states underperform in terms of reducing corruption, EITI membership offers the potential to reverse the pattern. The conditioning effect of EITI participation is also verified in the case of oil abundant economies. There are significant policy implications given the shielding mechanism that EITI mechanism can potentially offer against an ‘institutional resource curse’. In Section 4 we provide some cross-sectional evidence on the longer term links between mineral abundance, the duration of EITI membership and changes in corruption. Section 5 summarises our main findings and offers concluding remarks.


2.	The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative as An Anticorruption Tool

In this section, we provide a concise description of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative with an accompanied discussion on its benefits and limitations as an anticorruption tool (see also Kolstad and Wiig, 2009 and Corrigan, 2014 for a more elaborate discussion). The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative was launched in September 2002 as a voluntary tool to increase transparency and curb corruption in mineral rich states (EITI, 2013). Governments in member states need to disclose how much they receive from extractive companies operating in their countries and the companies need to disclose how much they pay. This is expected to limit corrupt practices in the extractive sector given that this verification exercise highlights any gap between government revenues from oil, gas, and mining and corresponding company payments. While the initiative is not a panacea for all institutional failures of mineral-rich states, it can potentially make a difference in terms of reducing corruption and increasing transparency in a mineral-rich context. Governments in member countries adhere to an internationally recognised transparency standard that demonstrates commitment to reform and anticorruption. Mining companies in implementing countries participate in a level playing field, in which all corporations involved need to disclose the same financial information and are, hence, aware of their competitors’ cash flows and tax liabilities (and although the EITI does not require a standardisation of taxes and contracts in the extractive industry, the enhanced transparency regarding information on tax payments, licenses and contracts is likely to help eliminate any unfair advantages and privileges in the sector). Citizens and civil society can receive information about financial flows in the extractive sector and demand transparency and accountability through a multi-stakeholder platform. Several international organisations have endorsed the initiative and currently provide advisory role (for example, the World Bank, the IMF, OECD etc). 
	Member countries participating in the scheme go through different stages. Once these steps have been carried out, the country moves to the second stage and receives a candidate status. It is worth noting that these steps are not a mere formality and there is often a significant time gap between expression of commitment and acknowledgement of candidature (for example, 4 years in the case of Azerbaijan and Ghana). Candidate countries are then required to fulfil several EITI implementation requirements: continuous and effective functioning of the multi-stakeholder group, timely publication of EITI reports, public disclosure of vital information related to the sector (for example, legal framework, fiscal regime and so forth), full disclosure of all related financial flows, the presence of a credible assurance process applying international standards (with the help of independent administrators) and an explicit attempt to raise public awareness of sectoral revenue streams. An independent validation process verifies whether the county has met all EITI requirements – the EITI Board then decides on whether the member country can be designated as EITI compliant (third stage)​[2]​. Countries cannot hold candidate status for more than 5 years, although, in practice, they are expected to become fully compliant much earlier (within 2.5 years from the date that they are admitted as candidates)​[3]​. Over time, there has been an increasing number of countries expressing interest to participate in the EITI scheme. For example, in 2008 there were 23 candidate countries – by 2015, there were 48 member states, 30 of which have already reached a compliant status.
	Several arguments have been put forward about the potential of the EITI as an anticorruption tool, which we here attempt to summarize (see also Kolstad & Wiig, 2009 and Corrigan, 2014).  The disclosure (and verification) of all extractive company payments (to the government) and all corresponding government revenues can help improve transparency in the sector – such a matching exercise ensures that mineral rents do not disappear in the process of collection. Participating governments also send a reputational signal to foreign investors that they are committed to reform and tackle corruption in the extractive industry. The same reputational signal also extends to mining companies in implementing countries that can demonstrate their commitment to transparency and corporate social responsibility. The EITI also creates a platform of communication between all key stakeholders in the sector, including citizens and civil society, which places additional control mechanisms on corruption and allows for a freer and more transparent dissemination of information (regarding financial flows in the extractive sector). The EITI secretariat provides several examples of good practice supported by the scheme and associated with improved transparency in the extractive sector in its annual progress report, as well as country-specific publications; these range from recently recovering almost half a billion US dollars from missing oil revenues in the case of Nigeria to uncovering improper awarding of mining contracts in Liberia and making companies more accountable with respect to how they manage the environmental aspects of mining activity in Mongolia, just to name a few.
	The EITI may, though, face multiple challenges as an effective anticorruption tool. Corruption can breed at different stages of the value chain and the EITI focuses on transparency in revenue collection (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). Contract procurement and public spending of mineral rents are also often characterised by corrupt practices, and these are important issues receiving less attention within the EITI scheme. Several complications may arise – for example Kolstad and Wiig (2009) explain that the multi-stakeholder group involved in the validation process may itself be susceptible to rent-seeking and patronage (Smith, Shepherd, & Dorward, 2012, also discuss the complex power relations across stakeholders), and Global Witness (2009) states that the input of the civil society can be rather limited in the process. Given all these conditionalities, the next section aims to empirically assess the performance of the EITI as an anticorruption tool in implementing countries.

33.	EITI Membership and Change in Corruption: Regression Analysis

Data and Estimation
In this section we explore the dependence of changes in corruption on mineral resources and EITI membership, as well as on a vector of other explanatory variables that have been found to be important in the literature. We expect that mineral rich countries find it more difficult to reduce corruption (given the large empirical evidence suggesting that mineral rents encourage corruption and harm institutional quality more broadly, see Arezki & Brückner, 2011; Baggio & Papyrakis, 2010; Bulte, Damania, & Deacon, 2005; Dietz, Neumayer, & de Soysa, 2007; Leite & Weidmann, 2002; Vicente, 2010). We also expect that this is likely to be less the case for countries implementing the EITI (Corrigan, 2014; Kolstad & Wiig, 2009; Mejía Acosta, 2013; O’Higgins, 2006), but whether EITI participation is sufficient to fully offset any institutional resource curse is a matter of (our) empirical investigation. It is, also, of interest to explore whether the stage in EITI implementation (that is, initial commitment, candidature, full compliance) may influence how member countries take advantage of the EITI to tackle corruption. To identify the dependence of changes in corruption on mineral dependence and EITI membership we estimate a series of cross-country panel regressions. For the purposes of our analysis the following empirical specification is estimated​[4]​:
ΔTransparencyit = α0 + α1Min.Dependence i(t-1) + α2Min.Dependence*EITI i(t-1) + α3Z i(t-1) + ui + εit, 	(1)
where ΔTransparencyit corresponds to the (annual) change in corruption for country i at time t, Min.Dependencei(t-1) refers to the value of mineral extraction in total economic activity (in the previous year), Min.Dependence*EITI is the interaction term between mineral dependence and EITI membership, Zi(t-1)  corresponds to the vector of (one-year lagged) control variables found to explain variation in institutional quality across countries in the literature (that is, the level of economic development, economic growth rate and a proxy for democracy)​[5]​ and ui and εit are the country-specific (time-invariant) and variable components of the error term respectively​[6]​. Our panel data analysis covers the 2002-2011 period (that is, the period since the inception of the EITI scheme)​[7]​.
	We make use of unbalanced panel data in order to benefit from the maximum possible number of observations. We adopt a random effects estimation, given that random effects estimators tend to be much more efficient for variables with little variation over time (which is the case for several of our explanatory variables, such as the measures of mineral dependence, democracy, lagged corruption and GDP per capita levels, which fluctuate little from one year to the next; see Halaby, 2004, Hsiao, 2007 and Neumayer, 2004 for an elaborate discussion). Fixed-effect estimations tend to overinflate the standard errors of the coefficients corresponding to variables with little time variation – a good example of this is the analysis presented by Corrigan (2004), who shows how variables typically thought to significantly correlate with good institutions in the economics literature (such as democracy and GDP per capita) lose all statistical significance when one does not adopt a random effects estimation​[8]​.  

Results
	We present our empirical estimations in Table 1. Our dependent variable (ΔTransparency) is the change in corruption over time captured by the change in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by Transparency International – this is one of the most comprehensible and widely used proxy of cross-country variation in corruption based on expert assessments and opinion surveys (see Elbahnasawy, 2014; Hanf et al. 2011; Krause and Méndez, 2009; Swaleheen, 2008). The index takes values between 0 and 10 with larger values corresponding to higher (lower) levels of country transparency (corruption) (data are provided by Transparency International, 2014). We add Mineral Dependence as an explanatory variable in all regressions of Table 1 – this is measured as the total mineral rents (coal, gas, oil, tin, gold, lead, zinc, iron, copper, nickel, silver, bauxite, and phosphate etc) as a percentage of GDP (data provided by the World Bank, 2014). We have created three EITI (participation) dummy variables that refer to a country reaching any of the three consecutive stages in EITI implementation – that is, EITI(commitment), EITI(candidate) and EITI(compliant).​[9]​ Given our interest in the moderating role of these variables in the corruption-minerals nexus, we interact them with our mineral dependence measure. In Column (1) we regress the change in corruption on mineral dependence, the interaction term for the EITI commitment stage, as well as the level of transparency in the previous year (Transparency(t-1)), given that improvements in transparency are expected to be smaller for countries with a very high transparency score in the previous period (given that the CPI index has an upper bound). We find that a 1 per cent difference in the share of mineral rents in GDP is associated with a 0.147 units drop in the transparency index over a period of one year (in other words, mineral rich countries tend to experience an increase in corruption, other things equal) – but more importantly, we find that this effect is fully offset by commitment to the EITI scheme (that is, the mineral rich countries that have expressed commitment to the EITI managed to escape the ‘institutional curse of mineral dependence’ and even experienced, on average, a slight improvement in transparency by (-0.147+0.160) = 0.013 units. These are effects of substantial magnitude, given that the 0.16 coefficient of EITI commitment refers to annual effects that can cumulatively make a large difference over time (for example, they can boost transparency by approximately a standard deviation for mineral-rich states over a period of 15 years). Furthermore, the coefficient of lagged transparency has a negative sign as expected.​[10]​
	In Column (2) of Table 1 we enrich our specification by adding two additional regressors that have been found to correlate with institutional quality in the literature; that is, the level of Income per capita, as well as the Growth rate (of GDP per capita) in the previous year. This is in line with a wide consensus in the empirical literature pointing to a negative link between (the level and pace of) economic development and corruption: richer (Persson, 2003; Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Serra, 2006) and faster-growing (Aidt et al., 2008; Paldam, 2002) economies tend to be better performers in constraining corrupt practices – as income levels rise, the relative return of corruption vs. other economic activities tends to decrease and the corruption control mechanisms of the state tend to improve. We, indeed, find a positive and significant coefficient for both variables. We find again that EITI commitment offsets the largest part of the corruption-increasing effect of mineral dependence (almost by three quarters; that is, by 0.185/0.243 = 76.13 per cent).
	In Column (3) of Table 1 we include a measure of democracy as an additional explanatory variable – we make use of the Polity2 index (range: -10 to 10) from the Polity IV Project that measures the democratic accountability of the political system (with higher values corresponding to greater democratic governance; data are provided by Marshall and Jaggers, 2014). Several empirical studies suggest that democracy alleviates corruption, as it makes politicians accountable to their electorate (for example, see Chowdhury, 2004; Lederman et al., 2005; Saha & Gounder, 2013; Treisman, 2000). While democracy seems to enhance transparency, we do not find the effect to be statistically significant. All the previous result hold – in particular, EITI commitment can offset the largest part of any corruption-increasing effect arising from mineral dependence (the corresponding coefficient  is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level). 
























44.	Eiti Membership And Change in Corruption: The Midterm Perspective

Table 6 replicates columns (3)-(4) of Table 1 (mineral dependence) and (8)-(9) (oil dependence) of Table 2 for a cross-sectional setting of the overall 2002-2011 period. The earlier panel-data analysis focused on the annual change in corruption in relation to participation in the EITI scheme in the preceding year. In Table 6, the change in corruption is now measured for the overall 2002-2011 period and the EITI variables are not dummies (as in the case of the panel regressions) but correspond to the number of years of EITI participation during the same period (for the first two phases of the scheme; that is, for the commitment and candidate phases)​[14]​. All other regressors refer to the beginning of the period (that is, for the year 2002; the variable growth refers to average annual growth for the entire period). The cross-sectional analysis is useful in capturing longer trends and, hence, avoiding year-by-year fluctuations (in changes in corruption) that could be possibly influenced by the short-term political business cycle or other temporary factors. 






	There has been an increasing interest in recent years in an ‘institutional resource curse’; that is, the fact that mineral rich nations tend to suffer from higher corruption levels and score lower in institutional quality more broadly. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative has been promoted since 2002 as a scheme that can help mineral-rich participating nations to curb corruption in their economies. In this study we have looked at the role of EITI membership in providing this facilitating role and also examined whether any effect is conditional on the stage in EITI participation (initial commitment, candidature, full compliance).
	Our empirical analysis suggests that mineral rich countries that participate in the scheme are more likely to shield themselves against the general tendency of mineral resources to increase corruption (that is, they largely crowd-out the corruption-enhancing effect associated with mineral wealth). We find that this is particularly the case when countries enter the second stage in EITI implementation (and become official candidates). This is likely to be related to the fact that during the second phase countries need to intensify effort and take a series of measures as a prerequisite for full compliance. 
	These findings have significant policy implications, given the limited empirical evidence that currently exists with respect to the benefits of the EITI scheme. Our analysis suggests that participation in the scheme can offset to a large extent the tendency of mineral rents to fuel corruption – while participation to the initiative is currently voluntary, international organizations or donor agencies could encourage broader participation, for example, by making the provision of aid conditional on EITI membership.    
	The question of what makes some countries more successful than others in tackling corruption is certainly one of the most fascinating development economists can ask, but also one that is difficult to answer due to the interplay of several factors. This analysis is simply a first step in exploring the relationship between EITI participation and transparency improvements over time. It does not advocate that EITI is a ‘one size fits all’ solution to all institutional failures (in other words, each institutional dimension and its relation to mineral resources and EITI participation should be examined separately). The relatively short life of the initiative prevented us from using changes in corruption over longer time periods as the dependent variable in a panel-data setting – our focus was, hence, on annual changes in corruption, and consequently many of the explanatory variables (including the ones pertaining to mineral resources) exhibited little time variation. As more data become available in the future, one could replicate the analysis using longer time differences in corruption and make, hence, use of country fixed effects (that limit any omitted variable bias). 
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Table 1. Change in Transparency, Minerals and EITI Participation
Dependent variable: ΔTransparency	Commitment	Candidate(4)	Compliant(5)
	(1)	(2)	(3)		
Constant 	    –0.027	    –0.378	     –0.371	     –0.368	     –0.355
Mineral Dependence 		  –0.147***	   (0.056)		  –0.243***	   (0.058)		  –0.182**	   (0.078)		  –0.173**	   (0.076)		  –0.141*	   (0.075)
Mineral Dependence*EITI(commitment)		   0.160**	   (0.077)		   0.185***	   (0.068)		   0.151***	   (0.061)		   		    
Mineral Dependence*EITI(candidate)					  0. 225***	   (0.083)		
Mineral Dependence*EITI(compliant)							    0.049	   (0.088)
Transparency (t-1)		   –0.010***	    (0.003)		  –0.029***	   (0.006)		   –0.029***	   (0.006)		   –0.029***	   (0.006)		   –0.029***	   (0.006)
Income per Capita			    0.047***	   (0.011)		    0.045***	   (0.012)		    0.045***	   (0.012)		    0.043***	   (0.012)
Growth		      0.255*     (0.154)	      0.226*     (0.153)	      0.240*     (0.155)	      0.252*     (0.154)
Democracy		  		   		    0.002     (0.002)		    0.002     (0.002)		    0.003     (0.002)
R2 overall 	0.43 	0.44	0.47 	0.47 	0.47 
Countries	134	132	127	127	127
N 	1129 	1111	1068 	1068	1068
Note: Country-clustered robust standard errors of coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. Time dummies included in all specifications. 

Table 2. Change in Transparency, Oil and EITI Participation
Dependent variable: ΔTransparency	Commitment	Candidate(9)	Compliant(10)
	(6)	(7)	(8)		
Constant 	    –0.031	    –0.368	     –0.344	     –0.336	     –0.323
Oil Dependence 		  –0.147***	   (0.051)		  –0.260***	   (0.069)		  –0.158**	   (0.083)		  –0.143**	   (0.075)		  –0.105*	   (0.072)
Oil Dependence*EITI(commitment)		   0.142**	   (0.065)		   0.217***	   (0.083)		   0.165**	   (0.075)		   		    
Oil Dependence*EITI(candidate)					   0.259***	   (0.093)		
Oil Dependence*EITI(compliant)							    0.132**	   (0.056)
Transparency (t-1)		   –0.010***	    (0.003)		   –0.028***	   (0.006)	     –0.028***	   (0.006)		   –0.028***	   (0.006)		   –0.027***	   (0.006)
Income per Capita			    0.046***	   (0.012)	      0.041***	   (0.013)		    0.034***	   (0.013)		    0.038***	   (0.013)
Growth		      0.177     (0.149)	      0.157     (0.148)	      0.172     (0.148)	      0.181     (0.147)
Democracy		  		   		    0.003     (0.002)		    0.003     (0.002)		    0.003*     (0.002)
R2 overall 	0.43 	0.47	0.47 	0.46	0.47 
Countries	137	135	130	130	130
N 	1152	1135	1092 	1092	1092
Note: Country-clustered robust standard errors of coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. Time dummies included in all specifications. 


Table 3. Change in Transparency and EITI Participation (high mineral/oil dependent sample)
Dependent variable: ΔTransparency	Commitment(11)	Candidate(12)	Commitment(13)	Candidate(14)
Constant 	    –0.330	    –0.327	     –0.366	     –0.338
Mineral Dependence 		  –0.167**	   (0.082)		  –0.159**	   (0.080)		  	
Oil Dependence 		  		  		  –0.150	   (0.098)	      –0.125	   (0.090)
Mineral Dependence*EITI(commitment)	      0.124**	   (0.063)	      			
Mineral Dependence*EITI(candidate)		      0.187**	   (0.084)	      		
Oil Dependence*EITI(commitment)			      0.152*	   (0.085)		
Oil Dependence*EITI(candidate)					    0.216**	   (0.094)
Transparency (t-1)		   –0.027***	    (0.006)		   –0.027***	   (0.006)		   –0.034***	   (0.009)		   –0.032***	   (0.009)
Income per Capita		    0.035***	   (0.014)		    0.034***	   (0.014)		    0.045***	   (0.018)		    0.040**	   (0.017)
Growth	      0.178     (0.138)	      0.190     (0.141)	     –0.001     (0.004)	      0.001     (0.002)
Democracy		    0.002     (0.002)	      0.002     (0.002)		    0.003     (0.003)		    0.003     (0.003)
R2 overall 	0.47 	0.45	0.47 	0.48 
Countries	108	108	74	74
N 	832	832	585 	585
Note: Country-clustered robust standard errors of coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. Time dummies included in all specifications. 
Table 4. Change in Transparency and EITI Participation (oil/mineral abundance)
Dependent variable: ΔTransparency	Commitment(15)	Candidate(16)	Commitment(17)	Candidate(18)
Constant 	    –0.307	    –0.311	     –0.333	     –0.336
Mineral Abundance		  –0.135	   (0.133)		  –0.146	   (0.132)		  	
Oil Abundance 		  		  		  –0.204*	   (0.108)	     –0.211*	   (0.108)
Mineral Abundance*EITI(commitment)	      0.250	   (0.194)	      			
Mineral Abundance*EITI(candidate)		      0.564**	   (0.254)	      		
Oil Abundance*EITI(commitment)			      0.195	   (0.208)		
Oil Abundance*EITI(candidate)					    0.433	   (0.279)
Transparency (t-1)		   –0.024***	    (0.005)		   –0.024***	   (0.005)		   –0.026***	   (0.005)		   –0.026***	   (0.005)
Income per Capita		    0.034***	   (0.011)		    0.035***	   (0.011)		    0.038***	   (0.011)		    0.039**	   (0.011)
Growth	      0.221     (0.146)	      0.222     (0.147)	      0.184     (0.145)	      0.187     (0.145)
Democracy		    0.004**     (0.002)	      0.004**     (0.002)		    0.004**     (0.002)		    0.004**     (0.002)
R2 overall 	0.46 	0.46	0.45	0.46
Countries	127	127	130	130
N 	1068	1068	1092 	1092
Note: Country-clustered robust standard errors of coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. Time dummies included in all specifications. 

Table 5. Other Institutional Proxies, Minerals and EITI Participation (Commitment)

















Table 6. Change in Transparency and EITI Participation (cross-sectional)
Dependent variable: ΔTransparency	Commitmen	Commitment(22)	Candidate(23)	Commitment(24)	Candidate(25)
Constant 	    –0.403	    –0.376	     –0.123	    –0.095
Mineral Dependence 		  –1.428*	   (0.748)		  –1.441**	   (0.749)			  
Oil Dependence 		  		  	      –0.886	   (1.413)		  –0.930	   (1.432)
Mineral Dependence*EITI(commitment)	      0.219***	   (0.080)	      			
Mineral Dependence*EITI(candidate)		      0.352***	   (0.124)			
Mineral Dependence*EITI(compliance)					
Oil Dependence*EITI(commitment)				    0.285**	   (0.133)	
Oil Dependence*EITI(candidate)				    	       0.467**	   (0.210)
Oil Dependence*EITI(compliance)				
Transparency(initial)		   –0.088*	    (0.051)		   –0.087*	   (0.051)		   –0.074	   (0.054)		   –0.073	    (0.054)
Income per Capita (initial)		    0.048	   (0.137)		    0.034	   (0.138)		    0.004	   (0.140)		    0.001	   (0.140)
Growth (overall)	      0.048     (0.045)	      0.044     (0.045)	      0.046     (0.043)	      0.047     (0.043)
Democracy (initial)		    0.039*     (0.021)	      0.040*     (0.021)		    0.049**     (0.019)		    0.049**     (0.019)
R2 adjusted	0.21 	0.21	0.19	0.19 
N 	93	93	93	93




Appendix 1: List of countries in sample
Albania* (9)	Iran, Islamic Rep. (8)	South Africa (9)
Algeria (8)	Iraq* (2)	Spain (9)
Angola (9)	Ireland (9)	Sri Lanka (9)
Armenia (8)	Israel (9)	Sudan (8)
Australia (9)	Italy (9)	Sweden (9)
Austria (9)	Jamaica (5)	Switzerland (9)
Azerbaijan* (9)	Japan (9)	Tajikistan* (8)
Bahrain (8)	Jordan (9)	Tanzania* (9)
Bangladesh (9)	Kazakhstan* (9)	Thailand (9)
Belarus (9)	Kenya (9)	Togo* (5)
Belgium (9)	Korea, Rep. (9)	Trinidad and Tobago* (9)
Benin (7)	Kosovo (2)	Tunisia (9)
Bolivia (9)	Kuwait (8)	Turkey (9)
Botswana (9)	Kyrgyz Republic* (8)	Turkmenistan (2)
Brazil (9)	Latvia (9)	Ukraine* (9)
Bulgaria (9)	Lebanon (6)	United Arab Emirates (8)
Cambodia (6)	Libya (8)	United Kingdom (9)
Cameroon* (9)	Lithuania (9)	United States* (9)
Canada (9)	Luxembourg (9)	Uruguay (9)
Chile (9)	Macedonia, FYR (8)	Uzbekistan (8)
China (9)	Malaysia (9)	Venezuela, RB (9)
Colombia* (9)	Mexico (9)	Vietnam (9)
Congo, Dem. Rep.* (7)	Moldova (9)	Yemen, Rep.* (8)
Congo, Rep. * (8)	Mongolia* (7)	Zambia* (9)
Costa Rica (9)	Montenegro (4)	Zimbabwe (9)




Czech Republic (9)	Netherlands (9)	
Denmark (9)	New Zealand (9)	
Dominican Republic (9)	Nicaragua (9)	
Ecuador (9)	Nigeria* (9)	
Egypt, Arab Rep. (9)	Norway* (9)	










Greece (9)	Russian Federation (9)	




India (9)	Slovak Republic (9)	
Indonesia* (9)	Slovenia (9)	
Note: * denotes EITI participant. Number of observations in parenthesis (for specification 3 of Table 1)

Appendix 2: Correlation Matrix

















Appendix 3: List of Variables Used in the Regressions
Transparency	Corruption Perception Index (CPI) based on “perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys”. 0-10 scale – higher values correspond to higher levels of country transparency. Source: Transparency International (2014).
Mineral Dependence	Total mineral rents (coal, gas, oil, tin, gold, lead, zinc, iron, copper, nickel, silver, bauxite, and phosphate etc) as percentage of GDP. Source: World Bank (2014).
Oil Dependence	Oil rents as percentage of GDP. Source: World Bank (2014).
Mineral Abundance	The log of total mineral rents (coal, gas, oil, tin, gold, lead, zinc, iron, copper, nickel, silver, bauxite, and phosphate etc) in per capita terms. Source: World Bank (2014).
Oil Abundance	The log of oil rents in per capita terms. Source: World Bank (2014).
EITI (commitment), EITI (candidate), EITI (compliance)	0-1 dummy variables capturing participation at the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) scheme. The three dummy variables measure participation at three phases: a. Country has expressed at least commitment to the EITI charter, b. Country has at least candidate status and c. country has fully complied with all requirements in the EITI standard. Source: EITI (2014).
Income per Capita	The log of real GDP per capita at 2011 international prices. Source: World Bank (2014).
Growth	Annual growth in real GDP per capita (2011 international prices). Source: World Bank (2014).
Democracy	Polity2 index (-10 to 10) from the Polity IV Project measuring the democratic accountability of the political system. Higher values corresponding to greater democratic governance. Source: Marshall and Jaggers (2014). 
Control of Corruption	Control of corruption index that captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. -2.5 to 2.5 scale – higher values correspond to lower levels of corruption. Source: WGI (2014).
Rule of Law	Rule of law index that captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. -2.5 to 2.5 scale – higher values correspond to better performance in rule of law. Source: WGI (2014).
Time of Contract Enforcement	Time required to enforce a contract is the number of calendar days from the filing of the lawsuit in court until the final determination and, in appropriate cases, payment. Source: World Bank (2014).




























Δ(Time of Contract Enforcement)	-1.712	32.872	483	285









^1	   When we refer to mineral resources, we refer to both oil and non-petroleum minerals.
^2	  The implementation process and rules are described in detail at the EITI Standard: see https://eiti.org/document/standard. An EITI candidate country? 
^3	  Some candidate countries are more successful than others in reaching full compliance – for example, Norway achieved compliance within approximately 2 years, while Afghanistan has been a candidate country for almost 5.5 years.
^4	  We carried out a number of diagnostics tests prior to proceeding with our empirical model. We carried out the Ramsey test for misspecification (by examining whether non-linear combinations of the fitted values help explain the actual changes in corruption) and in all cases we rejected the hypothesis that there are omitted variables. We created  several non-linear combinations of fitted values (starting from the simple quadratic term of the fitted values and progressively adding higher-order terms, up to the power of 8), and then check if these were jointly statistically different to 0. We also carried out the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity and in all cases we found that the error term is homoscedastic. In any case, we cluster our standard errors at the country level to allow for arbitrary country-specific correlation of errors.
^5	  We do not include the EITI dummy as a separate explanatory variable due to its high correlation with the interaction term (0.71, 0.75 and 0.85 for the case of commitment, candidature and compliance respectively) to avoid multicollinearity problems. This is discussed in several empirical papers in the literature, where it is not uncommon to drop some of the highly correlated component terms (for examples, see Etang, Fielding, & Knowles, 2011; Huang, 2008). Intuitively, one would also not expect EITI participation to have a direct effect on corruption, that is, beyond the corruption-reducing effect that it might have for mineral rich member countries.
^6	  Appendix 1 lists countries in the sample (for the richer specification of Table 1). Appendix 2 provides a correlation matrix for all variables appearing in the analysis and Appendix 3 lists all variable descriptions and data sources. Descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix 4.
^7	   In 2012, Transparency International changed the way of measuring its Corruption Perception Index – the new index is hence not comparable to its pre-2012 equivalent. Replicating our specifications for the 2012-2014 period (when data are again comparable) provides very similar results.
^8	  As a result of such limited within-cross-section variance, the Hausman test statistic also has insufficient power to select between fixed-effects and random-effects estimations and is, hence, inappropriate (for a discussion, see Baltagi, 2011, p. 321; Christen & Gatignon, 2011; Clark & Linzer, 2015).
^9	  The EITI dummy takes a value of 1 both for the year during which the country reaches the corresponding stage in EITI implementation (commitment, candidature, compliance), as well as for all consecutive years. 
^10	  The mineral abundance proxy is unlikely to be endogenous to changes in corruption – the level of mineral abundance is the result of combination of geography and long-term investment, while changes in corruption are yearly (that is, short-term). We run a series of Granger causality tests that indeed showed that the causality runs from mineral resources towards changes in corruption. Another possible endogeneity concern relates to whether it is not only EITI participation that influences changes in corruption, but whether the decision behind EITI participation is itself endogenous and dependent on the level of corruption. We run a series of Probit regressions where the EITI participation dummy is regressed on the level of corruption in the previous period, and/or other lagged variables (level of GDP per capita, democracy, and so forth). In none of these did we find the coefficient of corruption (or the corresponding average marginal effect) to be statistically significant.
^11	  We have also replicated the table for the case of non-petroleum minerals – results are in line with our earlier findings.
^12	  We have also replicated the specifications for the case of EITI compliant countries – the coefficients of both mineral and oil abundance, as well as those of the interaction terms, are all insignificant.
^13	  For Columns 19 and 21, the period of analysis extends to 2012 - for Column 20 to 2013.
^14	  The interaction terms remains statistically insignificant when results are replicated for the case of compliance.
